FRM考前辅导:一级风险管理创造价值
来源:
高顿网校
2013-11-29
Creating Value with Risk Management
1 、Basic Viewpoint
Hedging Irrelevance Proposition says that, in a perfect market, the firm cannot create value by hedging a risk when the price of bearing that risk within the firm is the same as the price of bearing it outside of the firm. However, financial markets are not likely to be perfect markets in practice which suggests that firm managers likely have many opportunities to create value for shareholders using financial risk management.
2、Creating Value in Different Ways
2.1 Handling Bankruptcy Costs and Financial Distress Costs
When a firm has risky debt in its capital structure, there is some probability that the firm’s operating income will be insufficient to pay the debt holders. In this case the firm may file for bankruptcy. In the real world, it is costly for firms to file for bankruptcy. Firms have to hire lawyers, incur court costs, and need to pay for all sorts of financial advice. Costs incurred as a result of a bankruptcy filing are called bankruptcy costs. The present value of future bankruptcy costs reduces the value of a firm. However, hedging can reduce cash flow volatility so that the present value of bankruptcy costs decreases because bankruptcy becomes less likely.
Moreover, even if bankruptcy is avoided, a firm in financial trouble may experience added costs from debt renegotiation, forgone value-creating projects, etc. The costs firm incur because of a poor financial situation are called costs of financial distress. Costs of financial distress can occur even if the firm never files for the bankruptcy or never defaults. The analysis of the benefits of risk management in reducing bankruptcy costs holds for all costs of financial distress also. Therefore, hedging can increase firm value if it helps avoid a large cost of financial distress.
In addition, the risk of bankruptcy and financial distress intuitionally cannot be hedged by the shareholders, thus, it may be value increasing for the firm to undertake risk management to reduce or eliminate these costs.
2.2 Moving Income Across Time and by Reducing Taxes
Assuming no carry-over provisions, the income tax in a very good year is high and is not offset by a tax refund in a year with losses. If we can rearrange the risks we take so that we have less income when the tax rate is high and more income when the tax rate is low, the present value of taxes paid is reduced. Therefore, by stabilizing earnings, corporations reduce the average tax payment over time, which should increase their value.
2.3 Reducing Diversifiable Risk of Large Shareholders
Generally, for investors who have a large position in a firm, unsystematic risks do not balance out. As a result, they might want the firm to reduce risk as homemade hedging may not be possible for this large investor. If the firm gains from having the large shareholder, then it can make sense to hedge to make it possible for the large shareholder to keep her investment in the firm.
There are two reasons why shareholder monitoring can increase firm value.
First, an investor might become a large shareholder because he has some ability in evaluating the actions of management in a particular firm. Such an investor has knowledge and skills that are valuable to the firm which helps the firm’s manager increase the value.
Second, managers do not necessarily maximize firm value but rather maximize their welfare like all economic agents. Therefore, monitoring can make it more likely that managers maximize firm value. In practice, investors hire managers to serve as their agents and give them discretion to run the company. However, good and bad managers are not always easy to identify. Without hedging, earnings fluctuate due to outside forces. This makes it difficult to identify the performance of management. With hedging, there is less room for excuses. Bad managers can be identified more easily and fired, which should increase firm value. In addition, shareholders can ensure that managers are motivated to maximize the value of the company’s shares through a managerial compensation contract that gives managers a stake in how well the firm does. If managers earn more when the firm does better, this induces them to work harder.
2.4 Reducing Probability of Debt Overhang
Consider a firm that has experienced poor operating results to the point where there is significant probability that there will not be enough firm value to satisfy the debt obligations and to where the equity is worthless. One implication of this situation is that managers may accept high-risk projects that will decrease expected firm value but will also increase the probability of positive equity value at the end of the period. Another implication is that management may also negatively impact firm value by not accepting positive net present value projects. The reason may probably lie in the fact that financing a profitable project by issuing new equity will increase firm value, but most of the increase in value will accrue to the debt holders. In conclusion, firms are said to have decreased value due to debt overhang. In another word, risk management that reduces the probability of getting into a situation of debt overhang can increase firm value.
2.5Reducing Information Asymmetries
When one party to a deal knows more than the other, we call this an information asymmetry. The costs associated with management’s opportunity to undertake projects that have a negative net present value when it is advantageous from them to do so are called agency costs of managerial discretion which make it harder for a firm to raise funds and increase the cost of funds. However, risk management can help to increase the confidence of outside investors that firm results reflect management quality, reducing funding costs and increasing firm value.
3 Example
3.1FRM EXAM 2009-QUESTION 1-2
By reducing the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy, a firm’s use of derivatives contracts to hedge its cash flow uncertainty will
a.Lower its value due to the transaction costs of derivatives trading
b.Enhance its value since investors cannot hedge such risks by themselves
c. Have no impact on its value as investors can costlessly diversify this risk
d. Have no impact as only systematic risks can be hedged with derivatives
Answer: b
The cost of financial distress is a market imperfection, or deadweight cost. By hedging, firms will lower this cost, which should increase the economic value of the firm.
3.2FRM EXAM 2009-QUESTION 1-8
In perfect markets, risk management expenditures aimed at reducing a firm’s diversifiable risk serve to
a.Make the firm more attractive to shareholders as long as costs of risk management are reasonable
b. Increase the firm’s value by lowering its cost of equity
c. Decrease the firm’s value whenever the costs of such risk management are positive
d. Has no impact on firm value
Answer: c
In perfect markets, risk management actions that lower the firm’s diversifiable risk should not affect its cost of capital, and hence will not increase value. Further, if these activities are costly, the firm value should decrease.
1 、Basic Viewpoint
Hedging Irrelevance Proposition says that, in a perfect market, the firm cannot create value by hedging a risk when the price of bearing that risk within the firm is the same as the price of bearing it outside of the firm. However, financial markets are not likely to be perfect markets in practice which suggests that firm managers likely have many opportunities to create value for shareholders using financial risk management.
2、Creating Value in Different Ways
2.1 Handling Bankruptcy Costs and Financial Distress Costs
When a firm has risky debt in its capital structure, there is some probability that the firm’s operating income will be insufficient to pay the debt holders. In this case the firm may file for bankruptcy. In the real world, it is costly for firms to file for bankruptcy. Firms have to hire lawyers, incur court costs, and need to pay for all sorts of financial advice. Costs incurred as a result of a bankruptcy filing are called bankruptcy costs. The present value of future bankruptcy costs reduces the value of a firm. However, hedging can reduce cash flow volatility so that the present value of bankruptcy costs decreases because bankruptcy becomes less likely.
Moreover, even if bankruptcy is avoided, a firm in financial trouble may experience added costs from debt renegotiation, forgone value-creating projects, etc. The costs firm incur because of a poor financial situation are called costs of financial distress. Costs of financial distress can occur even if the firm never files for the bankruptcy or never defaults. The analysis of the benefits of risk management in reducing bankruptcy costs holds for all costs of financial distress also. Therefore, hedging can increase firm value if it helps avoid a large cost of financial distress.
In addition, the risk of bankruptcy and financial distress intuitionally cannot be hedged by the shareholders, thus, it may be value increasing for the firm to undertake risk management to reduce or eliminate these costs.
2.2 Moving Income Across Time and by Reducing Taxes
Assuming no carry-over provisions, the income tax in a very good year is high and is not offset by a tax refund in a year with losses. If we can rearrange the risks we take so that we have less income when the tax rate is high and more income when the tax rate is low, the present value of taxes paid is reduced. Therefore, by stabilizing earnings, corporations reduce the average tax payment over time, which should increase their value.
2.3 Reducing Diversifiable Risk of Large Shareholders
Generally, for investors who have a large position in a firm, unsystematic risks do not balance out. As a result, they might want the firm to reduce risk as homemade hedging may not be possible for this large investor. If the firm gains from having the large shareholder, then it can make sense to hedge to make it possible for the large shareholder to keep her investment in the firm.
There are two reasons why shareholder monitoring can increase firm value.
First, an investor might become a large shareholder because he has some ability in evaluating the actions of management in a particular firm. Such an investor has knowledge and skills that are valuable to the firm which helps the firm’s manager increase the value.
Second, managers do not necessarily maximize firm value but rather maximize their welfare like all economic agents. Therefore, monitoring can make it more likely that managers maximize firm value. In practice, investors hire managers to serve as their agents and give them discretion to run the company. However, good and bad managers are not always easy to identify. Without hedging, earnings fluctuate due to outside forces. This makes it difficult to identify the performance of management. With hedging, there is less room for excuses. Bad managers can be identified more easily and fired, which should increase firm value. In addition, shareholders can ensure that managers are motivated to maximize the value of the company’s shares through a managerial compensation contract that gives managers a stake in how well the firm does. If managers earn more when the firm does better, this induces them to work harder.
2.4 Reducing Probability of Debt Overhang
Consider a firm that has experienced poor operating results to the point where there is significant probability that there will not be enough firm value to satisfy the debt obligations and to where the equity is worthless. One implication of this situation is that managers may accept high-risk projects that will decrease expected firm value but will also increase the probability of positive equity value at the end of the period. Another implication is that management may also negatively impact firm value by not accepting positive net present value projects. The reason may probably lie in the fact that financing a profitable project by issuing new equity will increase firm value, but most of the increase in value will accrue to the debt holders. In conclusion, firms are said to have decreased value due to debt overhang. In another word, risk management that reduces the probability of getting into a situation of debt overhang can increase firm value.
2.5Reducing Information Asymmetries
When one party to a deal knows more than the other, we call this an information asymmetry. The costs associated with management’s opportunity to undertake projects that have a negative net present value when it is advantageous from them to do so are called agency costs of managerial discretion which make it harder for a firm to raise funds and increase the cost of funds. However, risk management can help to increase the confidence of outside investors that firm results reflect management quality, reducing funding costs and increasing firm value.
3 Example
3.1FRM EXAM 2009-QUESTION 1-2
By reducing the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy, a firm’s use of derivatives contracts to hedge its cash flow uncertainty will
a.Lower its value due to the transaction costs of derivatives trading
b.Enhance its value since investors cannot hedge such risks by themselves
c. Have no impact on its value as investors can costlessly diversify this risk
d. Have no impact as only systematic risks can be hedged with derivatives
Answer: b
The cost of financial distress is a market imperfection, or deadweight cost. By hedging, firms will lower this cost, which should increase the economic value of the firm.
3.2FRM EXAM 2009-QUESTION 1-8
In perfect markets, risk management expenditures aimed at reducing a firm’s diversifiable risk serve to
a.Make the firm more attractive to shareholders as long as costs of risk management are reasonable
b. Increase the firm’s value by lowering its cost of equity
c. Decrease the firm’s value whenever the costs of such risk management are positive
d. Has no impact on firm value
Answer: c
In perfect markets, risk management actions that lower the firm’s diversifiable risk should not affect its cost of capital, and hence will not increase value. Further, if these activities are costly, the firm value should decrease.
扫一扫微信,*9时间获取2014年FRM考试报名时间和考试时间提醒
版权声明:本条内容自发布之日起,有效期为一个月。凡本网站注明“来源高顿教育”或“来源高顿网校”或“来源高顿”的所有作品,均为本网站合法拥有版权的作品,未经本网站授权,任何媒体、网站、个人不得转载、链接、转帖或以其他方式使用。
经本网站合法授权的,应在授权范围内使用,且使用时必须注明“来源高顿教育”或“来源高顿网校”或“来源高顿”,并不得对作品中出现的“高顿”字样进行删减、替换等。违反上述声明者,本网站将依法追究其法律责任。
本网站的部分资料转载自互联网,均尽力标明作者和出处。本网站转载的目的在于传递更多信息,并不意味着赞同其观点或证实其描述,本网站不对其真实性负责。
如您认为本网站刊载作品涉及版权等问题,请与本网站联系(邮箱fawu@gaodun.com,电话:021-31587497),本网站核实确认后会尽快予以处理。
点一下领资料
FRM二级(综合)精选习题
真题高频考点,刷题全靠这份资料
下载合集
FRM最新知识图谱框架图
梳理核心考点,一图看懂全部章节
下载合集
金融英语专业词汇(含解释)
全科英语词汇汇总,备考按照计划走
下载合集
FRM备考 热门问题解答
- frm学出来可以做什么工作?
-
各大银行是金融管理专业的一个就业方向,frm金融管理专业学生主要学习货币银行学、国际金融等方面的相关知识,适合在各大银行从事相关工作,这个方向的就业前景也非常可观,工作稳定,福利也很好。
- frm一共考几门?
-
FRM考试共两级,FRM一级四门科目,FRM二级六门科目。
- FRM金融风险管理师报名条件
-
There are no educational or professional prerequisites needed toregister.可以理解为,报名FRM考试没有任何的学历和专业的要求,只要是你想考,都可以报名的。
- frm考试形式
-
FRM考试为全英文考试,FRM一二考试均为机考。frm一级考试题型:一级100道选择题,frm二级考试题型:二级80道选择题。
严选名师 全流程服务
其他人还搜了
热门推荐
-
速看!2024年5月FRM考试备考时间规划! 2023-10-30
-
2024年FRM报名即将开始!在职考生请注意这样备考! 2023-10-25
-
FRM金融考试英语单词汇总 2023-10-20
-
FRM培训机构哪家好?有哪些机构值得推荐呢? 2023-10-20
-
2024年FRM备考难度分析!FRM培训有必要吗? 2023-10-17
-
2024年FRM考试难度分析!成都FRM培训机构怎么选? 2023-10-17
-
FRM自学难度大吗?武汉报哪家FRM培训班? 2023-10-17
-
全英文FRM考试常用考试词汇有哪些? 2023-10-12
-
零基础备考FRM需要金融培训吗?有哪些备考资料推荐? 2023-10-12
-
FRM考试可以自学通过吗?需要培训吗? 2023-10-11
-
英语不好?一文教你如何备考全英文FRM考试! 2023-10-09
-
FRM考试可以自学吗?英语不好怎么办? 2023-10-08
-
FRM是英文考试还是中文考试?全英文如何备考? 2023-10-07
-
速看!2024年备考FRM有哪些方法? 2023-10-03
-
FRM备考多长时间合适?如何分配备考时间? 2023-10-01
-
FRM备考多长时间合适?如何分配备考时间? 2023-10-01
-
11月FRM备考时间如何安排?你复习到哪了? 2023-09-29
-
11月FRM考生注意,这些备考误区千万别踩! 2023-09-22
-
FRM考试需要什么英语水平?内附FRM金融英语学习技巧 2023-09-19
-
FRM考试可以自学通过吗?自学难度大吗? 2023-09-18
-
11月FRM考生速进!FRM考试证件及注意事项一览! 2023-09-16
-
风险管理是什么?金融风险管理师是什么考试? 2023-09-15
-
金融风险管理师FRM考试是全英文吗? 2023-09-15
-
FRM2023年11月考试备考时间多久?有哪些教材推荐? 2023-09-13
-
FRM2023年考试时间一览!备考攻略分享! 2023-09-12
-
frm2023年考试时间什么时候?FRM备考资料有哪些? 2023-09-12
-
【经验分享】零基础如何备考FRM? 2023-09-12
-
什么叫固定利率?风险缓释是什么意思? 2023-09-05
-
11月FRM考试时间什么时候?内含FRM备考攻略 2023-08-26
-
2024年FRM二级考试内容分享!内附备考经验 2023-08-21